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Moral Responsibility and l.M Corporation 
by 
Richard T. � George  
Business ethics is a new and developing branch of ethical theory. If ethics is 
taken as a study of the foundations of morality. then business ethics might be taken 
as the study of the foundations of morality in business. or more gener311� as the 
study of moral norms in business activities. This certainly is part of what business 
ethics investigates. But there are problems in business ethics that require specific 
investigation and discussion and are not solved simply by applying nom1s of general 
ethics to particular situations in business. One of these specific problems with 
which I shall be concerned in this paper is the moral status of corporations. 
The actions of human beings as well as their characters are appropriate objects of 
moral evaluation. We thus speak of people being moral or immoral . and 
appropriately call murder. theft and perjury immoral. Objects. generally speaking. 
are neither moral nor immoral. though they may be used morally or immorally 
What of corporations? From a moral point of view are they like human beings. like 
objects, or significantly different from either? 
In attempting to answer the questions of the moral status of corporations I shall 
start by summarizing three different views, each of which I believe to be both 
partially right artd partially wrong. I shall call them the Organizational View. the 
Moralistic View and the Reductionist View. 
The corporation raises especially interesting problems because of its distinctive 
legal status, stated clearly by Chief Justice Marshall in Dartmouth College V. 
Woodward: "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing 
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only 
those properties which the charter of creation confers upon it, either expressly or 
as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to 
effect the object for which it was created."1 A corporation is said to be a legal 
person, and is characterized by some as a fictional person . A corporation serves as a 
means of fjmiting the liability of those who own it. Any view of the moral status of 
corporations must take account of at least this much of a corporation's legal status. 
I. 
The Organizational View grows out of a vast literature of formal organizations 
developed by sociologists, political scientists, and organizational theorists.l Much 
of the work on which it is founded is empirical. These theorists have studied 
organizations in general, as well as corporations in particular, and have generalized 
their findings, usually in the form of a model. 
Starting from the legal definition of a corporation, they go on to describe how 
corporations are organized and how they function. A corporation is typically 
established for a particular purpose or goal .  A profit-making corporation is 
established not only to make profit but also to make a particular product or to 
provide a particular service . In order to accomplish its end it takes on a certain 
organizational structure, usually involving division of labor and typically structured 
hierarchically. There are many kinds of corporations--family :• closely-held, 
not-for-profit, public, holding company, conglomerate, multinational. I shall focus 
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on the large, publicly-held manufacturing type corporation. Such a firm usually has 
a table of organizacion with designated positions. Each posi1ion has a iunction 
within the organization and carries with it certain tasks to be performed and 
obligations to be discharged. 
Now according to at least the dominant interpretation of the OrganizationaJ 
View, the corporation is a legal person and a legal person only. It has only 
"those properties which the charter of creation confers upon it:· and these do not 
include any moral characteristics. It is incorrect··a category mistake3 -to consider 
the corporation a moral person, since it has none of the requisite characteristics of 
moral persons. It is inappropriate, therefore, to speak of it in moral terms or to 
evaluate its actions from a moral point of view. The theory goes even further. 
however. The positions in a corporation are filled, of course, by human beings. 
Human beings are moraJl agents. But one must not, this theory holds, confuse the 
actions of individuals qua moral persons with their actions qua members of a 
corporation. As employees of a corporation they fill a certain slot or position. They 
are hired to perform certain tasks, and they perform those tasks not in virtue of 
their distinctive individuality, but in virtue of their ability to discharge a certain 
function. They act, therefore, as agents of the corporation . As agent s of the 
corporation they may not make independent moral judgments about what the 
corporation should or should not do from a moral point of view. They are to fulfill 
the objective of the corporation; and since the corporation is a legal entity, it is 
appropriately bound by law in its operation. But it would be inappropriate for any 
individual to apply what he perceived as the norms of morality to the corporation's 
operation under the mistaken assumption that the corporation was a moral entity. 
A person might be morally praised for giving his wealth to the poor. A corporate 
executive might welt be sued if he decided to give the corporation's wealth to the 
poor, since the corporation's assets are not his to dispose of in whatever way he 
chooses. He is an agent acting for the corporation , and should not confuse what is 
his from what belongs to the corporation. 
According to the Organizational View an individual in a corporation does not 
cease to be a moral being. Indeed, it is expected that employees of a corporation fill 
their positons conscientiously--that they put in a full day's work that they not steal 
from the corporation either by embezzlement or by taking home pencils and paper, 
and so on. But as agents of the corporation they are not personally morally 
responsible for actions they perform in their official capacity. Since the corporation 
is not a moral person it cannot be expected to be beneficent or altruistic in the way 
human persons might be expected to be, nor, since it is not a natural person and has 
no conscience or mind or will can it be expected to give itself the moral law. Just as 
the corporation is not a moral being, so those who act for it as its agents :are not 
acting as moral beings when they act in their official capacity 
The upshot of this position is that it is a mistake to evaluate corporations or 
corporate activities from a moral point of view, and it is also a mistake to e·valuate 
the actions of agents of a corporation from a moral point of view when they act in 
their capacity as agents. Both corporations and those who work for them can be 
and are bound by law. But any attempt to bind them by morality fails to 
understand their status and their function in society. Attacks on corporations for 
immoral actions are therefore the result of m uddled thinking, are inappropriate, 
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and are either knowing or unwitting attempts to undermine the corporation and its 
role in society. 
n 
The Moralistic View develops in oppos1t1on to the Organizational View .4 It 
claims that corporations are not only legal persons. They are not only legal fictions. 
They are real, effective actors on the social scene. Corporations build plants and 
close them down. Corporations strip mine. exploit workers, pollute the 
environment. Corporations obviously and clearly do a great many things in addi1 ion 
to producing products and in the process of producing products or providing 
services. To deny this is to deny the obvious. 
Now part of morality concerns the moral evaluation of actions or classes of 
actions. Hence, from a moral point of view, we can say that murder is. immoral. that 
lying is immoral, and so on. These actions. the Moralistic View goes on. are 
immoral. whether they are performed by an individual acting in his capacity as a 
moral being or by a corporation. If a corporation lies in its advertising, its action is 
immoral, whether or not it is illegal. If it exploits its workers, and exploitation is 
immoral, its action is immoral. To claim otherwise is to claim moral immunity for 
corporate actions. To make its point strongly, it argues that if the Organizational 
View is accepted ,  then though murder by an individual is immoral, murder by a 
corporation is not. To go even further, if an employee of a corporation must kill a 
competitor to achieve the objectives of the corporation . then though it would be 
immoral for him to do so as an individual person, he may do so with moral 
impunity as an agent of the corporation . If this is a consequence of the 
Organizational View, supporters of the Moralistic View argue then there is clearly 
something wrong with the Organizational View. Nor will the argument that murder 
is illegal and hence that the agent is legally prevented from committing the murder 
do. For we can make the same point by taking some action which is immoral but 
not illegal. 
Suppose we admit, for instance, that racial discrimination is immoral. In South 
Africa it is not megal. According to the Organizational View it is improper to claim 
that corporations in South Africa which follow the apartheid laws are acting 
immorally. The Moralistic View, on the other hand, argues that apartheid is 
immoral and that corporations which follow the apartheid laws are acting 
immorally. It is because apartheid is immoral that pressure is being brought to bear 
on South Africa to change the apartheid laws. Since the Organizational View makes 
it logically impossible to morally condemn an immoral practice of a corpora�ion. it 
is clearly deficient, defenders of the Moralistic View claim. Corporations are actors 
on the social scene. They act, and whether or not they act through aggents, is 
beside the point. Since they do act, and can properly be said to act as rational 
beings insofar as their actions are geared to achieving their ends by rational decision 
making procedures, their actions can appropriately be evaluated from a moral point 
of view. Since their accccctions can be so evaluated they can be judged to be moral 
or immoral, and corporations can correctly be characterized, just as people can, as 
being moral or immoral in terms of the patterns of their actions. 
To the legalistic claim of the Organizational View that corporations are legal 
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entities only, the Moralistic View has .a reply. The properties which a 
c-0rporation has, according to Justice Marshall include those .. incidental to its very 
existence." Since a corporation's actions are rationally determined and affect 
human welfare, its actions have, incidentally . moral scope, impact. and value. and 
should be considered from a moral point of view. As rational actors on the social 
scene corporations are moral agents, and they do not need an explicit statement to 
this effect in the law, any more than individual human beings need any legal 
statement that they are moral beings. Human beings and corporations are moral 
agents because they are rational beings whose actions affect human beings. 
m 
The third position, the Reductionist View , differs in certain respects from both 
the Organizational View and the Moralistic View. According to the Reductionist 
View a corporation is a fictitious entity. Strictly speaking it is a charter, a piece of 
paper, which assigns and limits certain prerogatives and responsibilities. It is not an 
entity. Et acts only insofar as human beings connected with it act. The human 
beings are related to one another according to a certain structure. Certain people 
may be in management positions, others may function as machine operators and 
still others as clerical workers. All the workers are related to one another in specific 
wasy so that they can be said to form the working foriee of the corporation. 
Stockholders are related to the corporation in other ways, and by virtue of holding 
corporate shares may have the right to vote at stockholder meetings, receive 
dividends, and so on. The corporation, however, is nothing over and above the 
people who are related to it and act for it. 5 
On the Reductionist View, the corporation does not act. Someone, some human 
person always acts for it. The so-called actions of the corporation are reducible to 
the actions of people acting in the name of the corporation. Consequently, it is 
incorrect to argue as the Moralistic View maintains, that since the corporation acts 
its actions can be morally evaluated. The corporation does not act. Therefore there 
are no a.ctions of the corporation to be morally evaluated. But the Organizational 
View is incorrect in thinking that this means that the corporation escapes all moral 
evaluation. According to the Reductionist View both the Moralistic View and the 
Organizational View make the same mistalke of reifying the corporation. The 
Organizational View claims that the people who work for a corporation serve only 
as agents for the corporation and in that capacity are not subject to moral 
evaluati<>n. 
The Reductionist View argues that a corporation is at any given time the people 
who make it up. A corporation can act only if individuals within the corporation 
act. There is no reason, however, to th.ink that individuals, simply because they act 
for a corporation do not have moral responsibility for their actions. The Moralistic 
View is correct, the Reductionists assert, in maintaining that murder and lying are 
wrong whether done by an individual in his own name or by an individual in the 
name of a corporation. When we say that a corporation misrepresents its products 
this is translatable into the statement that certain members of the corporation 
misrepresent the products made by the corporation When we say that a 
corporation engages in discrimination or that it exploits its workers, this is 
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translatable into the statements that certain people in the corporation exercise or 
dictate discrimination or exploit others who work for the corpora,ion. The upshot 
for the Reductionist View is that we should not be deceived by our use of collecti\<"'e 
terms into thinking that the corporation is anything more than an organized 
collection of people. We may speak as if the corporation did things: but we should 
always remember that it is people, not charters or relationships. th.at act. Attempts 
to avoid moral responsibility by claiming that one is not guilty of discrimination. 
e·ven when one discriminates. because it is corporation policy and one is only doing 
one ·s job, will not do. Those who establish such policies are guilty of doing so. and 
those who implement them are guilty of doing so. I t  may be true that in one's 
private life one is not prejudiced and that one abhors. discrimination. Nonetheless. mf 
one practices prejudice in one's corporate role. then in one's corporate role one ms 
guilty of practicing prejudice. 
IV 
These are three approaches to the question of the moral status of corporations. 
Each has a certain strength and plausibility. But they differ in important ways, and 
there is an obvious inclination to ask which one is right. Are cor_porations moral 
entities or aren't they? The question when put this way, I think is misleading. For 
the question seems to imply that the question is a factual one to which there is 
some right answer, if only we know where and how to look My suggestion is that 
the question is not a factual one, and that an answer to it cannot be found by 
looking in the right place or in the right way or by showing that the corporation is 
or is not a moral entity. 
Each of the three views, I believe, is plausible and each advances certain correct 
claims in its defense. For moral purposes, however. I do not think it is necessary to 
solve the problem of the metaphysical statui of corporations. It is sufficient to see 
what we wish to do with our moral language and how we wish to construe the 
nature of morality. I suggest further that though both of these involve our making a 
decision rather than discovering some fact, the decision is not to be made arbitrarily 
but for good reasons. Th.is procedure of evaluating and choosing on the basis of the 
best reasons and arguments available is consistent with the whole of the moral 
enterprise, whether morality is viewed from a consequentialist point of view as 
c!hoosing that action which prnduces the greatest good on the whole or from a 
deontological approach, from the point of view of seeing what reason demands. 
Now both the Moralistic View and the Reductionist View agree that the actions 
of a corporation can be judged from a moral point of view; but they disagree as to 
whether the agent whose actions are being evaluated are those of the corporation or 
those of the agents of the corporation. Without resolving the ontological status of 
the corporation, however, both views can be seen to be based on the facts as we aBI 
know them and on our ordinary use of terms. Those who hold the Moralistic View 
do not deny that corporations can act only insofar as people in the corporation act. 
They do not deny that if a corporation discriimiantes some people in the 
corporation must discriminate, or that if a corporation produces automobiles some 
people in the corporation must do certain activities which result in the cars being 
produced. They agree with ordinary usage, however, in holding that the corporation 
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is not to be identified with the people who happen to hold pos11ions in ll at a given 
time. If a member of a corporation signs a contract with a third party the contract 
does not depend on the original Stgner continuing to be an employee of the 
corporation. The corporation is bound both morally and legally by comm it men ts 
made in its name by those empowered to do so. To s.ay that the corporation is 
bound may simply mean that certain people within the corporation are bound to 
do certain things whether or not they made the original agreements. But for those 
who hold the Moralistic View it is a matter of indifference whether one person or 
another performs a certain action within the reorporation Wlhat is of concern is the 
action of the corporation or the policy of the corporation 
For practicaJ purposes the MoraJistic View evaluates the actions of a corporation 
from the outside. We can speak of the Pinto being a product of the Ford Motor 
Corporation. We can say that it is immoral for a company knowingly to produce 
and sell, without proper warning, cars they know to be especially and unusually 
dangerous. Now what is the purpose of making moral judgments about a 
corporation's discriminating or exploiting its workers or polluting? Well. why make 
moral judgments at all? There are, of course, many reasons. In making a moral 
judgment we express our moral feelings and we may feel strongly about an immoral 
action whether done by individuals on their own or done by individuals in the 
name of corporation, or done by a corporation or collective of any sort. Another 
reason for expressing moral judgments is to inn uence others to either feel as we do 
and take the same attitude towards the actio.n and/or to influence them to impose 
appropriate moraJ sanctions on the moral transgressor. 
The defender of the MoraJistic View, I indicated, took his position in opposition 
to the Organizational View rather than to the Reductionist View. But when it 
comes to sanctions, what he wishes in morally condemning the immoral actions of a 
corporation is to generate public pressure to bring about a change in the 
corporation's actions. Consider in this regard the calling for a boycott of a 
company's product. We have an instance in the Nestle case. The Nestle Company 
was charged with causing a great deal of human misery by promoting in a number 
of questionable ways the use of its powdered milk prnduct for infants in 
underdeveloped countries. The charge was that the company pushed the powder 
knowing. it was being mixed with polluted water under unhygienic co111drnon's 
resulting. in disease and death in large numbers of infants. In order to bring pressure 
to bear on the company to change its practice, a Coalition was formed calling for 
people to boycott all Nestle products. 
The point of the boycott was to produce a change in the company's policy. 
Those who called the boycott may not have known who within the company was 
responsible for the questionable practices, and they may not have cared. The 
boycott may have resulted in a cutback in production by the company with a 
consequent laying off of workers who were not involved in setting policy or in 
implementing it in any way. The boycott was called, however, not to lay off 
particular people but to change the company's policy. From the outside it is a 
matter of indifference who within the firm is resonsible for an immoral practice and 
who within it carries it  out. The important point is that the practice be identified as 
immoral and that moral pressure be brought to bear to stop tlhe practice. 
Hence, whether or not the attribution of an action to a corporation is strictly 
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speaking corre<:t. or whether it should be more appropriately attributed to the 
person or people within the corporation who make the decision and/or take the 
action, the attributing of the action to the corporation is both intelligible and from 
a practical point of view may be effective. 
The person who holds the Moralistic View need not deny that the actions of a 
corporation are reducible to the actions of individual persons, while still defending 
his practice of attributing actions to the corporation as if it were an entity and 
calling for sanctions against it as a whole. If the moral sanctions are effective, then 
the action will be stopped or the practice changed by individuals within the firm 
individually or collectively taking certain actions. Similarly the Reductionist need 
not deny that we do use collective terms, that we do speak about corporations as if 
they were entities, and so on. He need not change his or our way of speaking simply 
because he insists that if pressed he and we can reduce our collective terms to their 
individual components. 
So far I have argued that the Moralistic View engages in judging a corporation's 
actions from the outside, without necessarily knowing or caring how the actions are 
decided from within. From inside, the actions may also be attributed to the 
corporation as a whole, though more likely they are at least frequently seen as 
being the result of certain people doing certain thigns. Those on the inside know 
full well that certain actions of the corporation will not take place unless they do 
certain things. The workers on an assembly line know that the cars will not get 
produced unless they or others like them perform certain tasks. Policy will not get 
changed unless those capable of changing policy take the actions necessary to 
produce the changes. The Reductionist View gives an accurate account of the fact 
that a corporation does not act unless individuals within it act. 
As I have presented the two positions, the Moralistic and the Reductionist Views 
are not necessarily antithetical. Each is compatible with the other providing it does 
not deny, as it need not, what the other affirms. What about the Organizational 
VJiew? Ifs clearly incompatible with the other two insofar as it claims that the use 
of moral language is inappropriate with respect both to the corporation as a whole 
and to the people who fill various positions in the corporation, qua their status as 
filling those positions. Some aspects of the position, are, however. compatible with 
the other two views. 
Let us start with the point on which there is disagreement. Which position is to 
be preferred? Since corporate actions, whether they are the actions of corporations 
as they appear from the outside or whether they are broken down into the 
component actions of individuals within the corporation, are actions that are 
rationally performed and actions that affect human beings, they seem clearly to be 
amenable to moral evaluation. The argument which claims otherwise is based on 
two claims, both of which are false. The first is that because the corporation is a 
legal person it cannot be evaluated from a moral point of view. The fact that it is a 
legal person, however, does not preclude its acting in the world of goods and 
products and services, of employing people and affecting their lives. It is clear that 
the corporation does not act only in the legal arena and to that extent it is not only 
a legal person. To the extent that it acts outside the realm of legal discourse its 
actions are open to evaluation from other than legal perspectives, including from 
the moral point of view. The second argument relaims that people who are 
47 
8
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 12 [1981], No. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol12/iss1/3
Moral Responsibility and the Corporation 
employed by a corporation act as agents of the corporation. and since the� simply 
rm positions and function as replaceable cogs in a wheel. their actions are not 
amenable to moral evaluation. This latter claim depends. of course. on the first one. 
For only if the actions of the corporauon as a whole are immune from moral 
evaluation are the actions of its agents immune from such evaluation. 
Despite the mistakeness of the claim to moral immunity. however the 
Organizational View does. correctly emphasize certain aspects of the moraJ stacus of 
the corporation. Two of these are especially worthy of note. The first is that 
corporations are not natural persons. They are legal persons formed for certain 
limited purposes. As long as the ends for which they are formed are not immoral. 
and as long as the means by which they pursue those ends are not immoral. they are 
not bound by the large range of moral rules which bind natural persons. An 
obligation to charity, for instance, might bind individuals but not be applicable to 
corporations because of their limited sphere of activity. The showing of compassion 
might be an obligation of individuals but not of a corporation qua corporation. In 
general, the injunction to produce the greatest amount of good might well be 
interpreted differently by an individual person with a full range of activit ies open to 
him and by a corporation with very great restrictions on its purpose and 
appropriate activities. In particular, it is not clear that an appropriate end of every 
corporation is the improvement of the general welfare, if thlis means that it must 
engage in changing society er distriruting its wealth or improving the life of the 
inner city. and so on, in addition to or instead of achieving its own ends. There is a 
difference, however, between claiming that a corporation does not have the moral 
obligation to engage in good works and social welfare-which are the proper 
province of governments and perhaps of individuals--and claiming that it has no 
moral responsibility to society for what or how it  produces, how it treats its 
workers. its customers and those affected by its actions. 
The second point which is well taken by the Organizational View is the 
distinction it makes between the individual as individual and the individual insofar 
as he or she fills a position in a corporation. An employee of a corporation agrees to 
carry out certain tasks that go with a position in return for pay and other benefits. 
Corporate obedience and subservience of one's wishes and will to those of the 
corporation are part of what goes with the acceptance of most positions. But in 
accepting a position one does not cease being a moral person. One cannot morally 
have a corporate obligation to do what is immoral. And if a corporate policy is 
immoral, implementing that policy is immoral as well as initiating and continuing 
th� policy. Yet the force of the Organizational View is that an individual in a 
position should properly distinguish what is his from what is the corporation's, 
what his ends are from what the corporation's ends are, and should not 
inappropriately substitute the one for the other. 
Thus far I have concentrated on the moral evaluation of actions and I have 
argued that the actions of corporations, however construed, can be evaluated from 
a moral point of view. But I have not touched on the other aspect of morality that 
is the aspect that concerns responsibility and character - In reply to the question of 
whether or not corporations were moral beings I suggested that we look at what we 
wished to accomplish in making moral judgments and using moral language, and I 
argued that the actions of corporations should be morally evaluated. But do 
48 9
De George: Moral Responsibility and the Corporation
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1981
Richard T. DeG eorgc 
corporations have moral responsibility and moral character? ls it approprate to use 
the moral language of responsibility, character. conscience. shame and so on. with 
respect to corporations? My approach to answering this question will be similar to 
my approach to answering the previous one. Can we clarify what these terms mean 
when applied to a corporation and can our use of moral language in this way be 
defended by rational argument? 
The position of the Organizational View is that corporations. since they are not 
moral beings, have no moral responsibility and do not have to take moral factors 
into account in making business decisions. We have already examined the reason for 
claiming that corporations are not moral beings and found it to be inconclusive. 
Those who hold the Organizational view admit that the corporation is a rational 
decision maker. Their reason for claiming that the corporation has no moral 
responsibility is that it cannot appropriately take moral factors into account.6 
In speaking of the moral responsibility of human beings it is commonly agreed 
that human beings have moral responsibility for the actions they perform if they 
more or Jess freely chose to do the actions and to the extent that their 
responsibility is not mitigated or eliminated by excusing conditions. Moral 
responsibility may be imputed to an individual by others and it may also be 
assumed by an individual himself. 
Now since corporations act as rational agents, and since their actions affect 
others, there seems to be no valid reason why they should not consider the 
consequences of their actions from a moral as well as from a business point of view. 
Proponents of the Organizational View may not be willing to accept moral 
responsibility for the actions of corporations, if they are in a position to direct such 
action, and they may not choose to ascribe moral responsibility to other 
corporations. But unwillingness on the part of an agent to accept responsibility and 
unwillingness on the part of some people to ascribe responsibility does not mean 
that the corporation has no moral responsibility or that those who do ascribe moral 
resonsibility to it and hold it morally accountable are mistaken in their Views. And 
we have already seen the arguments in favor of ascribing such responsibility 
There is, however, a significant difference in the case o f  individuals and in the 
case of corporations with respect to moral responsibility In the individual case the 
ascribing of responsibility and the assumption of resonsibility are closely parallel. 
Responsibility is ascribed to an individual and can be assumed by the individual. In 
the case of a corporation moral responsibility may be ascribed to it from the 
outside, taking the corporation as a whole. But it is not clear that it can be assumed 
from within in the same way. For the corporation acts only through those who act 
for it. It is consequently they who must assume moral responsibility for the 
corporation. And it may not always be clear who within the corporation should 
assume it-whether it  should be shared or held by some individual, whether all 
associated with the corporation share in some of the guilt or shame that immoral 
actions on the part of the corporation would produce if similar actions were done 
by individuals, and so on. 
When harm is unjustly done to an individual by a corporation, the corporation 
has the moral obligation to make reparation to the individual . ft matters little 
whether the particular person who, for example, systematically paid women 
employees less than men for the same work, is still with the corporation. If  the 
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women deserve compensatjon for past injustke. the corporation has the moral 
obligation to make good. In this case someone who had nothing to do with the past 
injustices but who is now employed by the corporation may well have the moral 
obligation to take action to make up for past wage discrimination If a corporation 
is moraJly responsible for wrongs done, the corporation morally is obliged to make 
good those wron�. But exactly who must do what within the corporation is a 
question which can best be decided by an analysis of individual cases. 
In some instances responsibility will rest with the members of the corporate 
board of directors, eitheli collectively or distributively In other cases certain other 
individuals within the corporation might beall' moral responsibility. again either 
collectively or individuaEly. If shareholders can exercise no effective control, they 
may frequently have no moral responsibility for a corporation's actions. But they 
may have an obligation to divest themselves of their shares if their corporation 
adopts immoral practices they are not able to change. The distribution of moral 
responsibility within a corporation for a corporation's a.ctions is frequently 
complex. An adequate analysis of particular ,cases will involve an assessment of 
collective as well as of individuaJ responsibility. 
In the case of individuals, if moral responslbility is properly ascribed it can be 
properly assumed. We do not have a situation in which an individual did no moraJ 
wrong and yet is morally responsible for having done moral wrong. In the case of 
corporations, however, this might be the case. Each individual acting for the 
corporation might make an acceptable judgment and be personally morally 
blameless; yet the aggregate of the actions may result in the corporation's doing 
something which is morally blameworthy and for which it, not they, is morally 
responsible. 
This possibility does niot deal a fatal blow to the Reductionist position, though it 
does lend support to the position which would wish to combine it with the 
Moralistic View. What is at issue here is an analysis of action and agency . If some 
action A on the part of a corporation can be done only if a great many actions b, c,  
d . . . etc. are done by individuals within the corporation there is the possibility 
that A may in fact be morally wrong, though each of the subordinate actions 
making it up were individually morally justifiable. 7 
v 
I asked whether a corporation can be said to have a moral character. Now I have 
aJready implicitly claimed that having a moral character such as we normally 
attribute to individuals is not a necessary condition of ascribing moral responsibility 
to a corporation. We cannot therefore argue from moral resonsibility to moral 
character. 
There are some people who feel that it makes sense to speak of a corporation's 
having a conscience and having a moral character. They argue that, for instance, a 
firm which takes it s moral responsibilities seriously, which tries to be fair in d!ealing 
with its employees and customers, which takes into consideration the effects of its 
actions on the environment and local communities, and so on is correctly caJled a 
moral furn. If, moreover, it has built into its structures procedures for taking moral 
factors into account, then its morality is not dependent only on the people who 
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happen to fill particular positions at a given ume. Tradition also builds up so 1hat 
when one joins such a corpora1ion he or she takes pride in the p<.'llicies of 1he 
corporation. in its history. and so on. One tends to ider.1ify with these and hence 
these factors contribute to the continua1ion or moral atlitudes on the plrt of the 
corporation. 
Others. on the other hand. tend to find it difficult to in1agine what it means to 
say of a corporation that it has a consdence. other than that the people within the 
corporation act in appropriate circumstances as we would expect mdividuals who 
have consciences to act. 
Once again the distinction between seeing the corporation as an entity from the 
outside. and c;eeing it from the inside is appropriate A corporation can have a 
longer history than an individual associated with it Though a history and a 
tradition can be denied and actions taken which reverse it, they do have a certain 
force and momentum and can serve to affect tJ1e actions of thoSJ: in 
decision-making positions at any given time. 
To have said this much does not solve the question of the metaphysical staius of 
the corporation and of whether or not it is ontologically a moral being. But I 
believe that the account I have given and ilie conclusions I have drawn take into 
account all the pertinent facts and solve all ilie pertinent moral quest ions 
concerning the moral status of corporations. Their actions are appropriately 
evaluated from a moral point of view. they can be held morally responsible. I hey 
are capable of assuming the moral resonsibility properly ascribed to them. and they 
can be intelligibly characterized as moral and immorat in a way analogous to such 
characteri1.ations made of human beings. 
As a result we can intelligibly say that corporations arc morally responsible for 
their actions. They are morally responsible to themselves and to aU affected by 
their actions ·· the general public, their customers, their stock!holders, their 
employees, and the board. Within the corporate structure each group and the 
individuals thereof are likewise responsible to the other groups and the members 
thereof. 
I have spoken thus far in terms of moral obligations and moral responsibilities. I 
did not speak of social resonsibilities. Does a corporation have social 
responsibilities,8 might some of these be moral responsibilities, and how are they 
determined? Who is to say what they are? 
I have argued elsewhere that corporations are creatures of society and that what 
society may expect and demand of them at one time and place may be different 
from what society may expect and demand of them at another time and place. At 
one time American society simply expected business to produce the best goods at 
the cheapest price. It was a mandate which business fulfilled admirably. But there is 
clear evidence that the present mandate is no longer so simple or so simply fulfilled. 
What that mandate is and how it is to be fulfilled is determined by looking at 
legislation, at the demands made by consumers, workers and the general public and 
at each industry in the light of what is possible and practicable. The specifics are 
not to be handed out by professors of philosophy but worked out by social and 
public discussion, argument and debate - a debate obviously, in which the 
interested industries and firms should take an active part.9 
Finally, what is a corporation that wishes to be moral to do in response to claims 
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-� sometimes connicting claims ·· made to it in the name of morality'> The answer. I 
believe is to be found not only in following substantive moral injunctions but also 
in adopting certain procedures, and frequen tly in making internal structural 
changes. The details of such changes will vary from firm to firm. But I suggest that 
if a firm wishes to be moral it must assign responsibility both legal and moral at 
every level, and see that it is assumed: it must determine how much disclosure is 
appropriate and to whom; it must have channels and procedures for accountability, 
up, down, and laterally; it must have input lines whereby employees. consumers. 
stockholders, and the public can make known their concerns. demands and 
perceptions of the corporation ·s activities and responsibilities; it must develop a 
mechanism for considering them; it must enforce responsibility both within the 
firm and across an industry; it must preclude the necessity of whistleblowing by 
providing mechanisms, procedures and channels whereby those with concerns that 
lead to whistleblowing can get a fair hearing and possible action without fear of 
negative consequences; and it must hold some highly placed official responsible if 
insufficient attention is pajd to a legitimate claim of product safety and the like} 0 
Business ethics, as I noted in the beginning o f  this paper, is a new and developing 
branch of ethical theory. The solution to the specific problem of this paper, namely 
the· moral status of corporations and the consequences thereof, is not solved simply 
by deducing or applying what is known in general ethics to business. The problems 
of business ethics go beyond casuistry and are of both theoretical and practical 
interest and import. 
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